Automotive Has Fallen. Is Wind Next?

Türkçe sürüm: Otomotiv Düştü, Sıra Rüzgarda mı?

A landscape being worked on by robotic arms on a car assembly line, set against a natural scene with wind turbines.

What changed between March and October?

When the European Commission shared the details of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) in March 2026, a cautious optimism prevailed in Türkiye’s industrial circles, because countries bound to the EU by a customs union were, under certain conditions, to be treated as equivalent to Union origin. The regulation aimed to steer public procurement and public support in the member states towards products made in Europe, starting with strategic sectors such as steel, cement, aluminium, clean technologies and electric vehicles.

That picture changed within seven months. On 15-16 October 2026, France and Germany reached a compromise on “Made in Europe” for the automotive sector, and the new definition limits the scope to EU members and to European partners that were part of the EU internal market on 1 January 2020; in practice, this means the EU27, the United Kingdom and the countries of the European Economic Area. It requires 70% of vehicle components, excluding the battery, to be produced in this geography. The door was thus opened to the United Kingdom, while Türkiye, a partner of thirty years in the Customs Union, was placed in the same category as Japan and South Korea.

The automotive sector could only react after the Franco-German compromise had been announced. The wind sector’s advantage is that the clean technology file has not yet reached the table.

Although the IAA is a single act, its implementation is taking shape sector by sector. That automotive was the first file to reach the table can be explained by the political weight of the Paris-Berlin axis in this field. The clean technologies chapter, which also covers the wind industry, is waiting in line. The fact that the Commission has already had the 2020 internal market membership criterion accepted once, for automotive, considerably reduces the likelihood of that same criterion being reopened for wind.

Why does the automotive decision matter for the wind industry?

It is now easier to see that the ground on the wind side has been in preparation for some time. The Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) made it mandatory for member states to apply non-price criteria in a share of their renewable energy auctions. These criteria aim to limit dependence on any single country, and it is openly stated that the target is the Far East. The IAA takes this framework one step further by tying public support and public procurement to the condition of being “made in Europe”. The point we need to underline here is that, for a wall built against China to leave Türkiye outside as well, nobody needs to target Türkiye specifically; as in automotive, keeping the definition narrow is enough. The irony is that many of the EU-based companies likely to support this policy manufacture in Türkiye and export back to the EU.

Concrete risks for Türkiye’s wind industry

Türkiye is today one of the most important links in Europe’s wind supply chain. In towers, blades, generators, nacelle components and other auxiliary equipment, Türkiye has become a natural part of European OEMs’ production plans. The bulk of our wind equipment exports goes to the European market, and this structure carries a fragility similar to that of automotive. A narrow “Made in Europe” definition is likely to affect the sector through several channels:

Access to auctions: Once a non-price European content criterion enters the renewable energy auctions of EU countries, developers can be expected to reduce the share of components manufactured in Türkiye in their turbine orders. Large-volume components whose origin is easy to trace, such as towers and blades, will be the first items affected.

Exclusion from public support: The IAA also ties state aid and EU funds to the “Made in Europe” condition. An OEM that can obtain support to expand a factory in Europe will not be able to benefit from that support when it builds the same capacity in Türkiye. Türkiye’s cost advantage will thus be offset by the incentive gap before an investment decision is even made.

Investment flight: For OEMs, facilities in Türkiye are a cost advantage today; tomorrow they may turn into a compliance risk. For Poland, Romania or Spain to move ahead in new capacity investment decisions, the regulation does not even need to enter into force; the current uncertainty alone may, unfortunately, be enough to keep Türkiye out of the investment decision.

Risk of losing local suppliers and human capital: Our local equipment manufacturers and mechanical component producers mostly reach Europe through the OEMs’ facilities in Türkiye. When the volume of those facilities falls, the lower tiers of the supply chain are the first to lose. This is not merely a loss of exports; we face the risk of seeing the engineering know-how and skilled workforce we have built up over many years dispersed.

Since the act is not expected to be adopted before 2027, we still have enough time ahead of us. We need to use this time well and explain the Made with Europe approach, on a win-win basis, to all our stakeholders on every platform.

The domestic market effect must be added to these. Although Türkiye’s YEKA (Renewable Energy Resource Area) tenders are built on a local content requirement, when exports to Europe decline the economies of scale of the facilities in Türkiye will erode, turbine costs in the domestic market will rise, and the local content model will struggle to finance itself.

Does the Customs Union protect us?

The first reflex of industrialists is, rightly, to say “this is contrary to the Customs Union”. Yet the Customs Union regulates the free movement of industrial goods; it does not cover public procurement, state aid or services. And the centre of gravity of EU industrial policy has shifted to exactly these three areas in recent years. Since protectionism through customs tariffs is no longer possible, the same effect is being produced through public support and public procurement. This is also the fundamental reason why Türkiye is left outside: the Customs Union does not cover the field to which competition has moved.

This structural gap has in fact been known since 2016. The modernisation of the Customs Union came onto the agenda precisely to bring these areas (public procurement, services, agriculture) within its scope, but for political reasons it has made no progress for ten years. The picture we face in automotive today is, in part, the result of that decade. For the wind industry not to meet the same outcome, we need to go beyond defending the Customs Union merely as an “acquired right” and revive the modernisation negotiations with a concrete sectoral agenda.