Türkçe sürüm: Sıra Rüzgarda mı? (II): “Ya Bizimlesiniz ya da Başkalarıyla”
In the article “Automotive Has Fallen. Is Wind Next?”, published a few weeks ago, I discussed what the European Union’s “Made in Europe” approach could mean for Türkiye’s wind supply industry and how far the Customs Union can, or cannot, protect us in this process. In that article I treated the issue mainly as a matter of industrial policy and trade negotiation, and argued that the solution lies in answering “Made in Europe” with a “Made with Europe” approach, presenting Türkiye as a part of European industry.
I realised that BBC Turkish’s report from Brussels dated 6 November adds a dimension to this debate that I could not give enough room to in that article. The report’s headline asks whether the EU’s demand for strategic alignment could become a new obstacle for Türkiye, and at first glance it looks like a purely foreign policy story. But reading between the lines, we see that our request to be included in Made in Europe will no longer be assessed only under the headings of industry and trade, but also on how closely we align with the EU’s foreign policy priorities.
In this article, again wearing my supplier’s hat, I will try to read the report from the wind sector’s perspective and combine it with the framework we set out in the previous article.
What is strategic alignment, and how is it measured?
The concept the EU calls “strategic alignment” in its enlargement process is in fact an indicator that has existed for many years and is measured by a fairly simple method. It looks at the extent to which a candidate country joins the statements made on behalf of the Union by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the sanctions decisions applied by the EU; the rate of participation is reported as the alignment rate. An important detail underlined in the report is that this participation does not have to be immediate; a country that wishes to can raise its rate by declaring alignment retrospectively.
The real novelty is not in the method of measurement, but in what this rate is now being tied to. The European Commission intends to make “gradual integration”, the approach that foresees candidate countries being progressively included in EU programmes and policies before membership, conditional on strategic alignment. High Representative Kaja Kallas’s statement of 4 November made clear that this is not a procedural exercise, and that the real question is whether threats are seen in the same way as the EU sees them. According to diplomats from candidate countries, a “you are either with us or with others” rhetoric is becoming increasingly pronounced in meetings.
From Türkiye’s point of view, the picture is unfortunately not encouraging:
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| Alignment rate in the first years of the accession negotiations | Close to 80% |
| Alignment rate today (latest published European Commission data) | 4% |
| Position among candidate countries | Lowest (Serbia 63%, Georgia 38%) |
| Western Balkan countries | 100% |
| Ukraine / Moldova | 99% / 91% |
The Commission’s latest Türkiye Report notes that, although Türkiye voices its goal of EU membership, it has made no effort to improve its alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The part of the report that concerns us directly is this: the assessment in Brussels is that, if strategic alignment is not achieved, the update of the Customs Union and inclusion within the scope of “Made in EU”, both among Türkiye’s priority expectations, could be negatively affected. There are even comments that this condition could be put forward as an obstacle under headings with no direct connection, such as visa liberalisation.
Where is the link to Made in Europe?
In my previous article I tried to explain the following through the Industrial Accelerator Act and the Net-Zero Industry Act: the EU is making production in Europe an increasingly decisive criterion in public procurement, renewable energy auctions and industrial support, and wind turbines and their components sit right at the centre of this scope. Türkiye’s request is to be counted within this definition as a part of the Customs Union; the Ministry of Trade has publicly stated that it has discussed this request with EU officials.
As of 6 November the file is still at committee stage in the European Parliament, and it has not been settled how components of Turkish origin, or production stages carried out in Türkiye, will be recognised. In other words, the negotiating table is still open. What the BBC report shows us is that a foreign policy file is being placed on this table alongside the industry and trade files.
Whether a wind turbine tower or a nacelle component is counted as “of European origin” in a European auction may come to depend, even if indirectly, on the extent to which Ankara follows the EU’s foreign policy decisions.
We need to make one distinction correctly here. There is no “strategic alignment” clause in the current Made in Europe texts; the link is political, not legal. However, given that Brussels has openly expressed its intention to tie gradual integration to alignment, it seems quite likely to me that this political link will turn into a precondition during the negotiations.
What does it mean for the wind supply industry?
The risks I listed in the previous article (access to auctions, exclusion from public support, investment shift, loss of suppliers and human capital) remain valid. The strategic alignment debate appears to add further pressure on top of these risks.
The likelihood of not being counted as European origin is rising. The main customers of tower, blade, generator and mechanical component manufacturers in Türkiye are European turbine manufacturers. Once Made in Europe enters into force, these manufacturers may want to pull their supply chains inside the EU so as not to lose points in auctions. If Türkiye remains out of scope, this shift will be gradual but permanent; and the strategic alignment condition unfortunately increases the likelihood of remaining out of scope.
China’s capacity to fill the gap. Europe’s doors are closing to China; in March 2026 the United Kingdom blocked, on national security grounds, the GBP 1.5 billion turbine factory that Ming Yang planned to build in Scotland. In the same period, China’s turbine exports rose by 48.9% in 2025. This capacity, unable to enter Europe, is expected to turn to markets such as Türkiye, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. Being left outside the European market while also facing Chinese price pressure in our own domestic market is the worst-case scenario that we, as industrialists, need to think about.
Postponement of investment decisions. It is natural for European manufacturers to put decisions on expanding capacity or setting up new component lines in Türkiye on hold until the origin status becomes clear. The uncertainty itself is already confronting us as a cost.
A possible clash with our own local content policy. Local content rates in the YEKA tenders have reached gratifying levels. If Türkiye acts on the same reflex while Europe closes in on itself, we may end up with an industry squeezed between two markets and cut off from economies of scale. The growth arithmetic of Türkiye’s wind supply industry was built not on the domestic market alone, but on the sum of the domestic market and exports to Europe; the second term of this equation is now being tied to a political condition.
So what can we do?
In the previous article I set the “Made with Europe” thesis against “Made in Europe”, arguing that we need to present Türkiye not as Europe’s competitor but as the production depth of European industry. The BBC report does not change this thesis; on the contrary, it increases its urgency. It may be useful to think under three separate headings for three different counterparts.
As industrialists: We need to start preparing today on origin certification and supply chain transparency. When the EU’s definition of “European origin” becomes clear, the companies that can demonstrate their production stages, labour share and carbon data in a verifiable way will stay at the table. Alongside this, I believe the time has come to start building relationships with projects in regions such as India, the Gulf and Central Asia in order to reduce dependence on a single market; if Europe closes, Turkish industrialists also need to be present in the markets China will turn to.
As sector associations: I am of the view that we should not leave the Made in Europe file solely on the agenda of the Ministry of Trade. It is possible to develop a joint technical position with European sector associations such as WindEurope, and to show with numbers that tower and component supply will not be sufficient for Europe’s 2030 targets without Türkiye’s capacity. Perhaps the most effective way to overcome a political condition is for European industrialists to come to demand us for the sake of their own security of supply.
From a public policy perspective: Discussing the reasons for and consequences of the strategic alignment rate being declared at 4% goes beyond the limits of this article. But we do have to voice the possibility that the cost of this outcome to industry may become visible. Unlike automotive, the wind supply industry does not rest on thirty years of European integration; it is still gaining scale, and if it is left outside during these few years in which the market rules are being written, the way back will be difficult.
In place of a conclusion
The question of the first article was “is wind next?”. After the BBC report, I think we need to change the question slightly: will the wind supply industry have to pay the bill for a foreign policy assessment that is beyond its control? When we have no shortcomings in wind in terms of technology and quality, it is deeply frustrating that our sectoral position will be assessed in Brussels through a political lens alongside industrial criteria.
This article is a follow-up to “Automotive Has Fallen. Is Wind Next?”.
References:
- AB’nin stratejik uyum talebi Türkiye için yeni bir engel olur mu? (in Turkish) — BBC Türkçe, Güven Özalp, 6 November 2026
https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c64g11lx8jyzo - Bugün sipariş var, yarın pazar yok: Avrupa’nın yeni sanayi kuralı Türk fabrikalarını nasıl etkileyecek? (in Turkish) — Sanayi Gazetesi, 6 November 2026
https://sanayigazetesi.com.tr/bugun-siparis-var-yarin-pazar-yok-avrupanin-yeni-sanayi-kurali-turk-fabrikalarini-nasil-etkileyecek/ - UK Government blocks Chinese firm’s plan for world’s largest wind turbine factory in Scotland — STV News, March 2026
https://news.stv.tv/scotland/uk-government-blocks-chinese-firms-plan-for-worlds-largest-wind-turbine-factory-in-scotland - Çin’in rüzgâr türbini ihracatı yüzde 48,9 arttı (in Turkish) — CGTN Türk
https://www.cgtnturk.com/cinin-ruzgar-turbini-ihracati-yuzde-489-artti - Automotive Has Fallen. Is Wind Next? — iskenderkokey.com, 20 October 2026
https://iskenderkokey.com/2026/10/20/automotive-has-fallen-is-wind-next/
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